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CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS AND
IMPLICATIONS OF FEDERAL COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING LEGISLATION FOR STATE
AND LOCAL EMPLOYEES
*Ronald C. Brown
If a State is engaging in economic activities that are validly
regulated by the Federal Government when engaged in by
private persons, the State too may be forced to conform its
activities to federal regulation.'
To many observers of public sector collective bargaining, this
pronouncement by the Supreme Court laid to rest meaningful
discussion of whether the federal government has the constitu-
tional authority to pass collective bargaining legislation for
state and local employees. Yet significant constitutional ques-
tions remain unresolved as to the appropriate relationship be-
tween state and federal governments, the scope of the com-
merce clause of the Constitution which permits federal regula-
tion of state matters, and the degree to which the internal
affairs of a state can be regulated before that regulation unduly
interferes with the state's sovereignty.
Additionally, even if constitutional authority for such bar-
gaining legislation exists, further constitutional and legal ques-
tions will need resolution before a federal bargaining statute
can be enacted. For example, the issue of federal preemption
of state and local laws relating to working conditions and em-
ployment benefits would need special attention to determine
which, if any, such laws would be displaced or whether those
laws cover proper subjects for bargaining. The permissibility of
strikes by public employees would need careful examination to
determine whether or to what degree they could be regulated
without improperly infringing on first amendment rights; also
to be determined is the question of whether such alternatives
as binding interest arbitration will survive constitutional scru-
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1. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 197 (1968). On June 24, 1976, the Court handed
down its decision in National League of Cities v. Dunlop; for a discussion of the impact
of this recent case on Maryland v. Wirtz and this article, see note 121 supra.
Oklahoma City University Law Review
tiny. A multitude of such issues exist and await creative legis-
lative or judicial guidance to finalize the form of future public
sector collective bargaining legislation. This article will assess
the constitutional authority for federal bargaining legislation,
raise and analyze some of the many constitutional implications
which such legislation would have on state and local govern-
mental employers, and suggest means by which the natural
tensions between federal and state governments might be mini-
mized.
The need for examination and resolution of the constitu-
tional issues raised by federal bargaining law flows from the
recent explosive developments in public sector labor relations.
Not only has the number of public employees increased dra-
matically, from ten to fifteen million in the past decade, but
the number of union members has increased to the point where
almost a third of state and local employees are under union
agreements and about three million employees are union mem-
bers.2 And rapid growth of state bargaining legislation has oc-
curred so that forty states now have some type of legislation
covering some of their public employees.3
Notwithstanding this flurry of legislative activity, arguments
persist that only about one-half of the state legislation can be
described as comprehensive in coverage and in obligations. The
remainder is largely of the piecemeal, gap-filling variety that
has been passed in response to demands by special interest
groups such as firefighters or teachers.4 Even in those states
2. Hearings on H.R. 12532, H.R. 7684, and H.R. 9324 Before the Special Subcom-
mittee on Education and Labor, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 70, 71 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as Hearings].
3. For a summary of state labor laws, see BNA GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES RELATIONS
REPORT [hereinafter cited as GERR],.RF 51:501-523 (1975); and see Blair, State
Legislative Control over the Conditions of Public Employment: Defining the Scope of
Collective Bargaining for State and Municipal Employees, 26 VAND. L. REV. 3-4 & n.18
(1973); and see Hearings, supra note 2, at 132-34.
4. States having legislation covering all or most public employees with one or more
statutes include Alaska, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachu-
setts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York,
North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont and Wisconsin. GERR,
supra note 3; and see GERR RF 51:1011 et seq. (1974). States with separate legislation
covering teachers include Alaska, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana,
Kansas, Maryland, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island,
Vermont and Washington. Id. States with legislation covering policemen and/or fire-
fighters include Alabama, Georgia, Idaho, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas and Wyoming. Id.
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without express statutory authorization to engage in collective
bargaining, that authority may and often does exist in the con-
stitutional right to form and join unions and the implied statu-
tory authority to enter into negotiated agreements.' Full nego-
tiation usually occurs, however, only after the authority issues
have been litigated. And inchoate, frequently extralegal rela-
tionships result which are not necessarily legally enforceable,
are not regulated by a statutory scheme, and are not, therefore,
always in the public interest inasmuch as important public
rights can be compromised in the absence of legislative limita-
tion and guidance. Proponents of federal legislation point to
these developments as evidence of the states' default by estab-
lishing only minimal bargaining rights for most state and local
public employees. Thus, they have turned to the federal gov-
ernment for a legislative solution.'
Congress has responded by holding public hearings on the
question of the need for, and the form of, federal collective
bargaining legislation. Although several different bills have
been introduced, attention has recently been focused on two
bills. One would create a new agency to administer a separate
national public employment relations program,' and the other
would amend the National Labor Relations Act to include the
now excluded public employees.' In 1975-76, supporters of the
5. For example in Virginia, a non-statutory state, it is estimated that a third of the
state's teachers are under collective bargaining arrangements. For an example of recent
case law supporting the implied authority to negotiate, see Dayton Classroom Teachers
Ass'n v. Dayton Bd. of Educ., 41 Ohio St. 2d 127, 323 N.E.2d 714 (1975); East Chicago
Teachers, Union Local 511 v. Board of Trustees, 153 Ind. App. 463, 287 N.E.2d 891
(1972). See generally Dole, State and Local Public Employee Collective Bargaining in
the Absence of Explicit Legislative Authorization, 54 IOWA L. REV. 539 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Dole].
6. AFSCME President Jerry Wurf, representative of the proponents of federal legis-
lation, has stated:
No pattern prevails among the 50 states and 80,000 local government units
save one-that public employees are always in an inferior, secondary class
status compared to workers in private industry.
GERR No. 548, at B-16 (1974).
7. H.R. 8677 (National Public Employees Relations Act), 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973)
(H.R. 1488, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1974)).
8. H.R. 77, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975). The same bill was introduced earlier as H.R.
12532, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), and in the Senate as S. 3294. GERR No. 549, at B-
8 (1974). For general discussion of the appropriateness and alternatives of federal
legislation, see Brown, Federal Legislation For Public Sector Collective Bargaining: A
Minimum Standards Approach, 5 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 681 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Brown].
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first bill shifted their allegiance to the second, so that presently
there is only one supported bill before Congress.9 Since the time
of the public hearings, action on the bill has proceeded slowly.
This is due in part to the bill's controversial nature in an elec-
tion year and in larger part to the hope that the Supreme
Court, in ruling on the appropriate degree of federal involve-
ment in state labor relations under the Fair Labor Standards
Act, will by analogy give needed guidance on the constitutional
issues raised by proposed federal bargaining legislation.'0
I. FEDERALISM AND FEDERAL REGULATION OF STATE AND
LOCAL LABOR RELATIONS
In addition to examining the authority of the federal govern-
ment to intervene in state labor relations, the conceptual im-
pact of that intervention upon our system of federalism ought
to be considered." Federalism has long had a vital influence on
the pattern of American constitutional development and it has
been characterized as "the means and price of the formation
of the Union."'" Beyond that political reality, it is useful to
identify the values it was designed to serve and to outline how
it has been accommodated to the national interest of protecting
9. The National Education Association (NEA) has continued to modify its position.
In 1972 it supported categorical bargaining legislation for teachers. In 1973 it changed
its support to omnibus legislation with its president stating before the House Commit-
tee hearing testimony on H.R. 8677:
Our experience has convinced us that similarities among the various catego-
ries of public employees outweigh the dissimilarities and that there are cer-
tain well recognized principles and procedures that should be uniformly
applied to all public employees.
Contained in a booklet on testimony on H.R. 8677 prepared by Coalition of American
Public Employees 24 (1973). NEA has now endorsed H.R. 77.
10. National League of Cities v. Dunlop, No. 74-878 (U.S. filed Jan. 17, 1975) and
California v. Brennan, No. 74-879 (U.S. filed Jan. 17, 1975). Both cases have been
argued, and a decision is imminent.
11. Arguments relating to the propriety of bargaining legislation and its appropriate
form, i.e., whether or not to treat government as just another industry or to accomodate
its constitutional, legislative, financial, political and market differences will be set
aside from this discussion of the constitutional appropriateness of federal legislation.
Such arguments are summarized in Brown, supra note 8, at 684-86; and see Rhemus,
Constraints on Local Governments in Employee Bargaining, 67 MICH. L. REV. 919
(1969).
12. Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in 'the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543 (1954).
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and promoting interstate commerce" and to the tenth amend-
ment of the Constitution.'4
A. Federalism
The problem of allocating powers between nation and state
has often been couched in terms of the efficiency of a national
approach to problems versus the danger of a central govern-
ment's accumulating excessive power to the detriment of the
interests of the states. On the question of federal collective
bargaining legislation, the debate continues with opponents of
federal regulation claiming that vital state interests in labor
relations are best left to the control of the states. The claim is
that intricate balances of varying state and local governmental
structures require diversity and experimentation to resolve the
complex problems in state and local governmental employee
relations; solutions are necessarily going to be very different
from state to state. Therefore, to devise national uniform legis-
lation and to impose it upon the states would work to violate
the basic tenets of federalism.
Proponents of federal legislation maintain that important
employee rights of self-determination in labor relations are
being sacrificed during this ongoing period of "experimenta-
tion" by the states. In addition, they maintain that experi-
ments with bargaining legislation by the states have already
produced a recognizable set of minimum standards such as
secret ballot elections, employee free choice and prohibited
practices. Other controversial matters such as strikes, interest
arbitration, and bargaining by supervisors will most likely
never be resolved by the states.
Whether diversity would be displaced by a federal law is also
disputed by proponents of the law. Certainly the National
Labor Relations Act has not produced bland uniformity and
13. Justice Johnson made the Supreme Court's position clear many years ago when
he observed in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824):
If there was any one object riding over every-other in-the adoption of the
Constitution, it was to keep the commercial intercourse among the States
free from all invidious and partial restraints.
14. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohib-
ited by it to the States are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S.
CONST. amend. X.
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non-innovative collective bargaining practices. Experience il-
lustrates that divergent practices have developed in particular
industries such as construction, trucking, and the garment in-
dustries and that bargaining structures and strategies remain
diverse. Proponents maintain, therefore, that special occupa-
tional groups in the public sector such as firefighters, teachers
or social workers would hardly sacrifice their unique character-
istics, which could be preserved by specific statutory provisions
for different appropriate bargaining units and bargaining
structures.
B. Sovereignty
An essential aspect of federalism, in addition to its planned
maintenance of diversity, is the concept of sovereignty. Al-
though the legal ramifications of sovereignty will be discussed
subsequently, the conceptual ramifications need also be ad-
dressed. The premise of the state sovereignty argument in the
context of federal public sector bargaining legislation is that
state governments' decisions on matters of vital state interest
must be shielded from federal intervention. To permit federal
interference with matters constitutionally entrusted to the
states, such as the general welfare of its citizens, including its
employees, and to compel it to bargain with its citizens on
various matters, tends to undercut if not to abrogate the con-
cept of sovereignty. Sovereignty in this sense denotes immuniz-
ing and insulating against outside tampering with constitution-
ally based structures of state and local government.'" The con-
ceptual limitation on federal intervention is of fading practical
significance and to a great degree has been supplanted by judi-
cial constructions of the commerce clause of the Constitution.
These interpretations tend to negate lingering concepts of dual
federalism raised in conjunction with the tenth amendment.'6
15. An argument related to sovereignty, though more legal in nature, involves ques-
tions of illegal delegation of authority absent permission or authorizing legislation from
the state government such as when a government employer negotiates with its employ-
ees absent explicit statutory authorization or permits a third party to settle disputes.
Although cases finding delegation problems are becoming infrequent, illustration of
the principle can be found in Mugford v. Mayor & City Council, 185 Md. 266, 44 A.2d
745 (1945). See also Dole, supra note 5; and McAvoy, Binding Arbitration of Contract
Terms: A New Approach to the Resolution of Disputes in the Public Sector, 72 COLUM.
L. REV. 1192 (1972).
16. For a discussion on the concept that state powers limit the national power, i.e.,
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C. Default By States Necessitating and Providing a Rational
Basis for Federal Legislation
Experience has shown that, especially in the area of labor
legislation, when the states fail to meet a perceived public
need, the federal government may move to fill that need. Ex-
amples are laws which cover minimum wage, unemployment
compensation, occupational safety and health, civil rights and
private sector labor relations." Thus, allocation of authority
between national and state governments has on numerous oc-
casions been in favor of the federal government. Close ques-
tions are influenced by the pragmatic assessment that if regu-
lation is to come, the sophisticated distinctions of federalism
must yield to permit a more efficacious solution to major prob-
lems ineptly or inadequately managed by the states.
A brief assessment of legislative developments in state and
local labor relations shows that a substantial amount of new
legislation has been enacted in the past five years and that
additional legislation is forthcoming.'" However, it is equally
clear that less than half of the nearly forty recent statutes could
reasonably be categorized as comprehensive.' 9 Many statutes
cover only special interest groups such as teachers or fire-
fighters 0 and fewer than a fourth of the total require collective
bargaining for all employees should the employees choose to
bargain." Neither is the use of administrative machinery to
administer the acts uniformly established. Only a small per-
centage of states have created a new agency to administer their
laws, while others use existing agencies such as state boards of
"dual federalism," see generally A. MASON, THE SUPREME COURT: PALLADIUM OF
FREEDOM 116-18 (1962). The essentials of the doctrine have been summarized as:
(1) The national government is one of enumerated powers only; (2) Also, the
purposes which it may constitutionally promote are few; (3) Within their
respective spheres the two centers of government are "sovereign," and hence
"equal"; (4) The relation of the two centers with each other is one of tension
rather than collaboration.
Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REv. 1, 4 (1950).
17. For a clear description of federal intervention due to state inaction in unemploy-
ment compensation, see Larson & Murray, The Development of Unemployment Insur-
ance in the United States, 8 VAND. L. REv. 181, 185 (1955).
18. See note 3, supra.
19. See Brown, supra note 8, at 696-97.
20. Id.
21. Id. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 283. For a more detailed analysis, see GERR,
supra notes 3 & 4.
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education. Seven states permit local employers rather than an
agency to determine the appropriate bargaining unit 2 State
labor relations legislation has also covered representation ques-
tions, bargaining obligations, impasse procedures, strike reso-
lution and union security arrangements, some of which show
great innovation and experimentation. Patterns of legislation
have emerged which are sufficient to permit description and
provide future guidance as to the minimum acceptable stan-
dards in those states which have passed legislation. This
guidance could prove invaluable in the drafting or interpreting
of a federal public sector bargaining law should the federal
government be found constitutionally authorized to pass such
a law.
In those states without applicable legislation the courts have
been called upon to protect the organizational rights of employ-
ees who choose to unionize, contributing to a growing corpus
of common law public sector labor relations. For example, in
nonstatutory states, extra-legal, de facto bargaining relation-
ships have developed as a result of courts' holdings that there
is a constitutional right to organize. In addition, although there
is no constitutional right to bargain, there may well be an
implied statutory right of the employer to bargain if he so
chooses. 3
Thus, a preliminary assessment of legislative enactments by
the states leads to the conclusion that the states have not done
enough to refute the argument that they have defaulted by
inaction and underregulation14 This argument provides the
constitutionally necessary "rational basis" for federal legisla-
22. Hearings, supra note 2, at 284; and see Smith, State and Local Advisory Reports
on Public Employment Labor Legislation: A Comparative Analysis, 67 MICH. L. REV.
891 (1969).
23. See Brown, Public Sector Collective Bargaining: Perspective and Legislative
Opportunities, 15 WM. & MARY L. REv. 57, 79-82 (1973).
24. Former Secretary of Labor Hodgson in congressional testimony on the question
of federal legislation stated:
This lack of experience makes it impossible to adequately evaluate the effi-
ciency and effort of various statutory provisions upon the governmental unit,
public employees, and public interest.
Hearings, supra note 2, at 281. AFSCME President Jerry Wurf, speaking to the issue
of whether diversity and experimentation should be permitted to continue, commented
that public employees have tired of being the "white rats in a labor-management




tion. Analysis of whether legal authority exists for Congress to
legislate over particular areas neglected by the states, without
unduly violating the basic structural concepts of federalism or
improperly interfering with protected areas of sovereignty must
resolve any question of whether it makes a significant differ-
ence that it is public rather than private employees that would
be regulated.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF FEDERAL BARGAINING
LEGISLATION
Paramount to any discussion of the propriety of federal legis-
lation is a determination of its legality. The authority for the
federal government to regulate the labor relations of the states
must be found, if at all, in the United States Constitution
within the commerce clause and the necessary-and-proper
clause; the activities of state and local governments must first
have a sufficient effect on interstate commerce to be a proper
subject of federal legislation, and second, the legislation will be
valid only where Congress has a rational basis for its regulatory
scheme to protect commerce. Additionally, the scope of regula-
tion under the commerce power must not be found to be so
expansive as to violate any constitutional immunities of the
states, either by transgressing tenth amendment powers re-
served to the states or by improperly displacing "sovereign"
powers of the states. These issues as well as the possible effect
that the eleventh amendment may have in limiting national
authority to regulate the states will be discussed below.
A. National Authority Under the Commerce Clause
The commerce clause creates a national legislative power to
protect the free flow of interstate commerce which overrides
powers of the states.25 Although the principle is generally ac-
cepted, the continuing subject of inquiry is the scope of Con-
gress' power under the clause. Chief Justice Marshall in 1824
described it as the plenary power to regulate and went on to
say:
25. See 1 C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 568 (1937); Abel, The
Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Convention and in Contemporary Comment,
25 MINN. L. REV. 432 (1941).
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This power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in
itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowl-
edges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the Consti-
tution. 6
While the Supreme Court for a time departed from Chief
Justice Marshall's broad definition of power under the com-
merce clause, the modern judicial interpretations have steadily
expanded its scope, so that the modern commerce power is as
broad as Marshall's original definition. In recent years the Su-
preme Court has consistently ruled that federal regulation of
labor relations is a proper constitutional exercise of congres-
sional power under the commerce clause; matters which have
the potential for obstructing the interstate flow of goods, even
though involving an employer engaged solely in intrastate ac-
tivities, are subject to federal regulation.27 In clear language the
Court has stated:
The fundamental principle is that the power to regulate com-
merce is the power to enact "all appropriate legislation" for
"its protection and advancement". . . . Although activities
may be intrastate in character when separately considered,
if they have such a close and substantial relation to interstate
commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to
protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions, Con-
gress cannot be denied the power to exercise that con-
trol . 2.
The Supreme Court, in testing the limits of the scope of the
commerce clause, has consistently found that even though the
regulated activity itself might properly be called intrastate ac-
tivity, where interstate commerce may be affected, it is a pro-
per subject for regulation.29 Thus, with the distinction between
intrastate and interstate activity closely drawn, and the au-
thority of Congress under the commerce clause expanded, it
has been observed:
26. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824).
27. See generally P. BENSON, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE, 1937-
1970 (1970).
28. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 36-7 (1936); and see United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
29. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224 (1963);




It may be true that the application of the principles now
approved by the Supreme Court may leave only minor as-
pects of an economy free from the regulatory power of Con-
gress. The reason for this, however, is not legal but
economic. 0 (Emphasis added.)
The Supreme Court has in an increasing number of cases
indicated that federal regulation of public sector employment
relations is likewise constitutionally permissible under the
commerce clause. In 1968 the Court upheld the extension of the
Fair Labor Standards Act to cover public employees of state-
owned hospitals and schools. 3' In 1976, the Supreme Court has
been asked to resolve the same issues raised in that case in the
National League of Cities32 case.
Recent decisions provide insight into the likely outcome of
the National League of Cities case. For example, the case of Fry
v. United States3 held that the federal government had consti-
tutional authority to pass the Economic Stabilization Act
which created an agency which in turn forbade pay increases
to state employees in Ohio in excess of 7 percent, notwithstand-
ing the state's decision to pay more. Although the arguments
were stated not in terms of the commerce power, but in terms
of the limitations on that power imposed by the tenth amend-
ment, Justice Marshall found little difficulty in finding that
Maryland v. Wirtz was dispositive and that the states were not
immune from federal regulation under the commerce clause.34
Even though the scope of the commerce clause may be ex-
tended so as to permit federal regulation of state and local
employees, questions remain as to whether Congress in passing
federal bargaining legislation will have based its decision on a
"rational basis" in an effort to protect the needs of interstate
commerce as reflected in the statutory purposes.3 5 Inasmuch as
30. Stern, Problems of Yesteryear- Commerce and Due Process, 4 VAND. L. REV.
446, 468 (1951).
31. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
32. National League of Cities v. Dunlop, No. 74-878 (U.S. filed Jan. 17, 1975);
California v. Brennan, No. 74-879 (U.S. filed Jan. 17, 1975).
33. 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
34. Id. at 548. Justice Rehnquist in dissent seeks to analyze the cases used by the
majority to redefine the appropriate allocation of authority between state and federal
governments and thus provide a basis in the future for overruling Maryland v. Wirtz.
Id. at 549.
35. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964).
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the only bill presently before Congress, House Resolution No.
77, would amend the NLRA to remove the exemption for state
and local employees, an examination of the purposes of the
NLRA in the context of public sector bargaining is in order to
determine the constitutionality of this added coverage. The act
begins by noting:
The denial by some employers of the right to organize and the
refusal by some employers to accept the procedure of collec-
tive bargaining lead to strikes and other forms of industrial
strife or unrest, which have the intent or the necessary effect
of burdening or obstructing commerce .... 36
The basic purposes of the act are to avoid or minimize this
industrial strife and unrest, and to provide for equality of bar-
gaining power between employees and employer. 37
In the private sector, the Supreme Court has ruled that fed-
eral regulation of labor relations is a proper constitutional exer-
cise of power under the commerce clause. In NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corporation,3 the Court held:
stoppage of operations by industrial strife would have a
most serious effect upon interstate commerce. . . .Experi-
ence has abundantly demonstrated that the recognition of
the right of employees to self-organization and to have repre-
sentatives of their own choosing for the purpose of collective
bargaining is often an essential condition of industrial
peace. 9
The question then becomes whether Congress can, after appro-
priate investigation, conclude that labor problems that exist in
the private sector likewise exist or may exist in the public
sector.
Some guidance on this issue is found in Maryland v. Wirtz,4"
where the Court, in upholding the extension of the Fair Labor
Standards Act to public employees, stated that "strikes and
work stoppages involving employees of schools and hospitals,
events which unfortunately are not infrequent, obviously inter-
36. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
37. Id.
38. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
39. Id. at 41-42.
40. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
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rupt and burden this flow of goods across state lines."'" That
the "flow of goods" is properly deemed substantial is apparent
when one considers that in 1970 the interstate purchases made
for all state and local governments amounted to an estimated
$121 billion, or 92 percent of total state and local governmental
expenditures. This figure represents 12.4 percent of our gross
national product (GNP), and involved over eleven million pub-
lic employees and over three million private employees. 41
As to the point that public employee strikes can and do
occur, it has been noted that in 1966 there were 142 work stop-
pages resulting in a total loss of 455,000 man-days of work; in
1973, 386 work stoppages by state and local governmental em-
ployees resulted in a loss of 2,299,300 man-days of work.43
In the absence of federal legisation, there is significant po-
tential for labor unrest in the possible depression of wage rates
(presumably resulting from the absence of collective bargain-
ing) by states or localities which are seeking to gain a competi-
tive advantage over their neighboring governments. Such a
possibility may well have influenced the Court in Maryland v.
Wirtz, where the Court noted that it was logical to infer that
the pay and hours of employees affect the employer's competi-
tive position.4 It is a similarly logical inference that such com-
petition presently exists between states and localities in that
each is continually vying to attract business investments, prop-
erty development, etc.; and it is by no means unfair to observe
41. Id. at 195. In Maryland, 87 percent of the $8 million spent for supplies and
equipment by its public school system during the year represented direct interstate
purchases. Id. at 194.
42. Hearings, supra note 2, at 34. In 1971, purchases amounted to $135 billion,
constituting 12 percent of the gross national product (GNP). 119 CONG. REC. 14,057
(daily ed. July 19, 1973). Of this figure, 57 percent was for compensating some 9.7
million employees (the remaining 43 percent constituted over 5 percent of the GNP);
and employment generated by the purchase of goods and supplies by these activities
accounted for an additional 3.7 million jobs, making a total of 13.4 million jobs, which
is more than 16 percent of the nation's total civilian employment. Id. For a summary
of the effect on commerce of spending and employment by state and local government,
see S. REP. No. 690, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
43. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, REPORT No. 434, WORK STOP-
PAGES IN GOVERNMENT, p. 3 (1973). For a treatment of the consequences of a strike on
strikers and on the community, see Thiebolt & Corwin, Welfare and Strikes, The Use
of Public Funds to Support Strikers, LABOR RELATIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY SERIES,
Report No. 6 (Wharton School of Fin. & Commerce 1972).
44. 392 U.S. at 190.
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that the locality with the lowest costs of public services (water,
gas, police, trash pickup) and the lowest tax rates will be most
attractive to the prospective investor.4 5 Minimization of the
disruptive aspects of such a competition should provide a valid,
rational basis for legislation under the commerce clause."
Another issue that arises under the application of the com-
merce clause is whether it is limited to strictly commercial
matters, leaving governmental functions under the control of
state sovereignty. Years ago the Supreme Court addressed this
issue by observing that the commercial versus governmental
quagmire involves ". . . distinctions so finespun and capri-
cious as to be almost incapable of being held in the mind for
adequate formulation" and that the courts' use of such inher-
ently unsound distinctions would only result in chaos.47 The
Court upheld the same principle in Maryland v. Wirtz:
It is clear that the federal government, when acting within a
delegated power, may override countervailing state interests
whether these be described as 'governmental' or 'proprietary'
in character.48
In view of the long history of precedents which buttress the
Maryland v. Wirtz holding, it would appear that the authority
of Congress under the commerce clause to pass federal bargain-
ing legislation would be within the scope of that clause; as in
Maryland v. Wirtz establishment of minimum labor standards
would rest on a rational basis.4" The legal inquiry continues,
however, as to whether the sovereignty of the states or the
immunity of the tenth amendment provide a limitation on the
scope of the commerce power.
45. For detailed statistics as to the costs of such public services, see, e.g., BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATE GOVERNMENT FINANCES IN 1973, Table
No. 7, at 24-5 (1974).
46. For discussion of the relevancy of this factor in Maryland v. Wirtz, see 392 U.S.
at 190.
47. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 65, 68 (1955). For example,
the types of activities in which government employees are engaged include work in
hospitals, transit operations, highway construction, education and private guard serv-
ices, all, to some degree, having private sector counterparts. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR
1971 REPORT TO CONGRESS, NONSUPERVISORY EMPLOYEES IN STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS 52-7.
48. 392 U.S. at 195. See also Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 101 (1946).
49. 392 U.S. at 194.
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B. State Sovereignty and the Tenth Amendment: Limitation
on National Authority
Even assuming that the authority of the federal government
to regulate commerce has become nearly boundless, the ques-
tion still arises whether under our system of federalism there
are or should be limits on the federal government's ability to
regulate the sovereign affairs of the states. Early notions of
"dual federalism," the concept that the tenth amendment sets
an independent limitation on the powers of Congress and that
national and state governments are distinct, separate, and
impenetrable, have given way over the years to constitutional
interpretations which have broadened the power of the federal
government to legislate over the states. 0 It has been said that
the reason for the demise of dual federalism is not "legal but
economic,"'" as the economy becomes more interdependent;
yet the basis for these constitutional interpretations was laid
at the time the Constitution was created. James Madison, for
example, spoke against making the tenth amendment the
touchstone of federal legislative power:
Interference with the power of the states was no constitu-
tional criterion of the power of Congress. If the power was not
given, Congress could not exercise it; if given, they might
exercise it, although it should interfere with the laws or even
the Constitution of the States. 52
The Supreme Court, in a long line of precedents, has main-
tained the position that the framers of the Constitution in-
tended that the commerce power "though limited to specified
objects is plenary as to those objects," 53 and that the tenth
amendment "does not operate as a limitation upon the powers,
express or implied, delegated to the national government."'54
Though the tenth amendment has been characterized as a
"truism," merely stating that "all is retained which has not
50. See Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1 (1950).
51. Sterns, Problems of Yesteryear-Commerce and Due Process, 4 VAND. L. REV.
446, 468 (1951).
52. II ANNALS OF CONGRESS 1897 (1791), and quoted in Sperry v. Florida Bar, 373
U.S. 379, 403 (1963).
53. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 197 (1824).
54. Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 102 (1946).
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been surrendered, '55 it still may be found to have significance
in the context of federal regulation under the commerce power.
The Supreme Court has recently observed that the tenth
amendment "expressly declares the constitutional policy that
Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the
states' integrity or their ability to function effectively in a fed-
eral system."5 In upholding the right of the federal government
to impose wage controls over state employees, the Court found
that a regulation that affected the state's labor relations did
not constitute too drastic or improper an invasion of state sov-
ereignty. 5 Yet this limitation may be difficult to define. For
example, in Maryland v. Wirtz, the Supreme Court made the
point that "as long ago as Sanitary District v. United States,
266 U.S. 405, [this] Court put to rest the contention that state
concerns might constitutionally 'outweigh' the importance of
an otherwise valid federal statute regulating commerce. 58
A related argument is that the Court should distinguish be-
tween state governmental and non-governmental activities,
and that only the latter should be a proper subject of federal
legislation. The Supreme Court showed its disdain for this dis-
tinction by holding in Maryland v. Wirtz: "[it is clear that
the Federal Government, when acting within a delegated
power, may override countervailing state interests whether
these be described as 'governmental' or 'proprietary' in charac-
ter . . .,51 and "the State . . .may be forced to conform its
activities to federal regulation."60 More recently, the Court, in
55. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
56. Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975).
57. Id. The dissent in Fry takes a different view, noting that although the majority
claims to find the tenth amendment to have meaning, it is difficult to show what it is.
Id. at 550. Justice Rehnquist then cites for support the dissent of Justice Douglas in
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 205 (1968) which decries the apparent limitlessness
of federal power to control commerce: "If all this can be done, then the National
Government could devour the essentials of state sovereignty, though that sovereignty
is attested by the Tenth Amendment." Opponents of federal regulation in National
League of Cities v. Dunlop and California v. Brennan, supra note 10, both presently
before the Supreme Court, maintain that Fry is not a precedent for federal regulation
but rather is distinguishable on grounds that the existence of a national emergency
sustains a burden of the compelling national interest in upholding th Economic Stabi-
lization Act of 1970. GERR No. 647, at B-10 (1976).
58. 392 U.S. 183, 195-96 (1968).
59. Id. at 195.
60. Id. at 197. See also Parden v. Terminal R.R., 377 U.S. 184 (1964); California v.
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discussing the ability of the federal government to regulate the
employment relationship of state governments under the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) stated:
Where employees in state institutions, not conducted for
profit, have such a relation to interstate commerce that na-
tional policy, of which Congress is the keeper, indicates that
their status should be raised, Congress can act."
A final issue requiring discussion is whether federal legisla-
tion which imposes financial burdens on the states is constitu-
tionally valid. This issue has been addressed by the Supreme
Court, which has determined that such considerations "raise
not constitutional issues, but questions of policy. They relate
to the wisdom, need and effectiveness of a particular project.
They are therefore questions for the Congress, not the
Courts."6 2
Opponents of federal bargaining legislation maintain that
enormous burdens will be placed on governmental employers
by compulsory bargaining through additionally negotiated
benefits to employees and by the added costs of administering
a labor relations program."3 The Supreme Court, in discussing
the cost impact of the FLSA amendments, has resolved this
issue by holding that the validity of Congressional action under
the commerce power is not affected by the fact that "it may
place new or even enormous fiscal burdens on the states." 4
United States, 320 U.S. 577 (1943); United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936);
Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill. v. United States, 289 U.S. 48 (1933).
61. Employees v. Missouri Public Health Dep't, 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
62. Oklahoma v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 527 (1941). The Court added,
"[Nior is it for us to determine whether the resulting benefits to commerce as a result
of this particular exercise by Congress of the commerce power outweigh the costs of
the undertaking." Id. at 528. See also Sanitary Dist. v. United States, 266 U.S. 405,
432 (1925).
63. For a discussion of some of the possible implications of compulsory bargaining
in the public sector and its costs, particularly in loss of sovereignty, see Petro,
Sovereignty and Compulsory Public Sector Bargaining, 10 WAKE FOREsT L. REV. 25
(1974).
64. Employees v. Missouri Public Health Dep't, 411 U.S. 279 (1973). It should also
be noted that, while on the one hand the federal government imposes fiscal burdens,
it also provides much funding. In 1975, federal aid to state and local governments is
estimated to total approximately $52 billion and will finance about 22 percent of state
and local expenditures. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, SPECIAL ANALYSES, BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOV'T, 203, 205 (1974).
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C. Eleventh Amendment as Possible Limitation on National
Authority
As discussed above, Congress has broad legislative powers
based on the commerce clause which limit the power that the
states had until that power was delegated to the federal govern-
ment under the Constitution. 5 By this delegation the states
necessarily relinquished any part of their sovereignty that
would stand in the way of such regulation. However, a ques-
tion arises as to what effect, if any, the eleventh amendment
has in providing a possible constitutional immunity to the
applicability of federal legislation to the states. 7 To a certain
extent the eleventh amendment, even though directed to judi-
cial power, does limit congressional power under the com-
merce clause. The eleventh amendment state immunity pro-
hibits Congress in some cases from providing federal jurisdic-
tion over violations of a citizen's federal rights by the states. 8
Though the precise nature and effects of the eleventh amend-
ment are often difficult to define, certain conclusions can be
reached as to its potential impact on federal bargaining legisla-
tion. The recent holding in Employees v. Missouri Depart-
ment of Health & Welfare made clear that Congress has the
constitutional power under the commerce clause to legislate in
the area of labor standards applied to public employers.'"
Speaking for the majority, Justice Douglas found no constitu-
tional impediments to Congress' regulating the states in their
capacity as employers under the FLSA. He noted that the
"states surrendered a portion of their sovereignty when they
granted Congress the power to regulate commerce."'" The issue
of the case, however, was whether employees could sue their
state employers in-the absence of a clear expression that Con-
65. See Parden v. Terminal R.R., 377 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
66. Id. at 192.
67. "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
68. For a complete treatment of the origins and evolution of the eleventh amend-
ment, see C. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY (1972).
69. See, e.g., Comment, The Elusive Eleventh Amendment and the Perimeters of
Federal Power, 46 U. COLO. L. REV. 211 (1974).
70. 411 U.S. 279, 282-86 (1973).
71. Id. at 286, quoting Parden v. Terminal R.R., 377 U.S. at 191.
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gress intended to lift the nonconsenting states' usual immuni-
ties from suit by a private citizen when brought in the federal
courts. The Court ruled that despite the plenary power of Con-
gress over commerce, congressional intent to lift the immunity
provided by the eleventh amendment was not to be implied,
but must be express.7" Justice White, dissenting in Parden, also
agreed that "only when Congress has . . . expressly declared
that any State which undertakes given regulable conduct will
be deemed thereby to have waived its immunity should courts
disallow the invocation of this defense."" Thus, the cases indi-
cate that, by express provision, Congress may lift the states'
immunities.
Nevertheless, the question is not so easily resolved. Though
immunities can be waived vis-d-vis the federal government's
right to sue, the constitutional amendment appears clearly to
prohibit suits by citizens against the states in federal courts.
The Court in Employees stated:
By holding that Congress did not lift the sovereign immunity
of the States under the FLSA, we do not make the extension
of coverage to state employees meaningless. . . . [The Act]
gives the Secretary of Labor authority to bring suit ...
Suits by the United States are not barred by the Constitu-
tion."
In Edelman v. Jordan, the Court held that the eleventh amend-
ment was violated when a decree in a suit by a private citizen
ordered the state to make retroactive welfare payments.75 How-
ever, the Court again distinguished it from a suit which is
brought on behalf of the United States." In sum, the federal
government has constitutional authority under the commerce
power to legislate over the states and to sue them for violations;
and it is not limited by any eleventh amendment immunities.
However, it also appears that the federal courts remain without
72. The Court added that Congress can "readily repair the deficiency ... by simply
amending the Act expressly to declare that a State that engages in an enterprise
covered by the 1966 amendments shall be amenable to suit under § 16 (b) in federal
court." Employees v. Missouri Public Health Dep't, 411 U.S. 279, 308-09 (1973).
73. 377 U.S. at 198-99.
74. 411 U.S. 279, 285-86. See also United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140-
41 (1972).
75. 415 U.S. 651, 669 (1974).
76. Id.
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jurisdiction to entertain suits by private citizens against the
states notwithstanding dicta in the Employees case.7"
An obvious way to avoid this apparent limitation on federal
legislative remedies is for Congress to establish that federal
rights will be redressed in state courts. Indeed, there is preced-
ent for this simple solution;" and the argument that states may
have an obligation to provide a forum for the vindication of
federal rights under the supremacy clause of the Constitution
has some validity."
The possible limitation of remedies under federal legislation
does not affect the constitutionality of the act. In Maryland v.
Wirtz, the Court held:
The constitutionality of applying the substantive require-
ments of the Act to the States is not, in our view, affected by
the possibility that one or more remedies the Act provides
might not be available when a State is the employer-
defendant.0
The relevancy of the above discussion of available remedies
to the issue of the constitutionality of federal bargaining legis-
lation may be minimal when it is recalled that states have, for
the most part, consented in employment contracts to sue and
be sued, and that most contract claims are necessarily brought
in state court. However, drafters of federal legislation would
need to provide proper forums for suit and remedies, especially
in view of possible federal preemption problems and other re-
lated and unrelated constitutional implications raised by fed-
eral bargaining legislation.
77. See note 72, supra. Of course, public officials under section 1983 can be enjoined
from prospectively violating the law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970); see Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U.S. 651, 675-77 (1973).
78. Clover Bottom Hosp. & School v. Townsend, 513 S.W.2d 505 (Tenn. 1974); Glick
v. Montana, 509 P.2d 1 (Mont. 1973).
79. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947). See generally Hart, The Power of Congress
to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. REV.
1362 (1953). It may also be possible for the Government to sue as the party in interest
for the benefit of the private citizen. See also United States Fidelity v. Kenyon, 204
U.S. 349, 357 (1907).
80. 392 U.S. 183, 200 (1968). The Court added, "Percolating through each of [the
Act'sI provisions for relief are interests of the United States and problems of immun-
ity, agency, and consent to suit .... They are almost impossible and most unneces-




III. REMAINING CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS
Assuming that constitutional authority exists for Congress to
pass federal bargaining legislation, certain issues having con-
stitutional implications do arise and should be carefully exam-
ined and resolved prior to enactment. It is the purpose of this
section to raise some of the issues and their implications rather
than to provide definitive analysis or judgments regarding their
desired or probable resolution, a task best left to separate un-
dertakings and/or legislative inquiry.
The constitutional obligations of state and local employers
flow of course from their being governmental employers. That
is, constitutional duties are owed by government, not only to
its citizens, but also to its employees. Innumerable conflicts
arise in public sector labor relations which have constitutional
dimensions. Two recurring problems with constitutional impli-
cations are those involving (1) associational and equal protec-
tion rights and duties, and (2) preemption.
A. First and Fourteenth Amendment Rights and Duties
A myriad of possible conflicts involving first and fourteenth
amendment rights arise in the public sector. For example, it
has been shown that public employees have a constitutional
right to organize and form unions and to be free from employer
discrimination because of such organization. But what is the
extent of the public employer's right to limit such conduct or
to accord different treatment to competing unions (e.g., denial
of dues check-off) or to deny or permit a meeting with a
statutorily defined "non-exclusive" employee representative?
Even absent statutory proscription, the Courts have, to a
large extent, created a constitutionally based system of unfair
employer practices. For example, public employees may not be
dismissed or disciplined for a lawful exercise of their first
amendment rights to associate or assemble."' In organizational
campaigns the employer retains free speech rights and may
actively provide persuasive information on the relative merits
81. E.g., AFSCME v. Woodward, 406 F.2d 137 (8th Cir. 1969); McLaughlin v. Tilen-
dis, 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968); Atkins v. City of Charlotte, 296 F. Supp. 1068
(W.D.N.C. 1969).
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of unionism 2 or of one union over another; he may deny institu-
tional advantages such as the use of school mailboxes during
an organizational campaign, or prohibit solicitation on behalf
of a union (within certain limitations). 3 However, the employ-
ers' conduct may be proscribed not only for exceeding his law-
ful interests in regulating first amendment conduct, 4 but also
for violating the proscriptions of the fourteenth amendment.
The fourteenth amendment prohibits discriminatory treat-
ment of similarly situated classes of citizens without valid rea-
sons for the classification. 5 The courts have enforced this re-
quirement by requiring employers to treat competing unions
equally during pre-election periods; if, for example, the em-
ployer grants institutional advantages to one competitor, he
cannot deny that privilege to other competitors. 6 Decisions
have also established constitutional criteria for determining
the validity of no-solicitation rules.87
Two cases in public sector labor relations with constitutional
dimensions are currently before the Supreme Court. The first
deals with a public employer's meeting only with a statutorily
recognized exclusive bargaining agent, when other employee or
citizen groups wished to meet with the employer to discuss
matters within the scope of bargainable subjects.88 The Wis-
82. See Friedman v. Union Free School Dist. No. 1, Town of Islip, 314 F. Supp. 223
(E.D.N.Y. 1970); Los Angeles Teachers Union, AFT Local 1021 v. City Bd. of Educ.,
71 Cal. 2d 551, 445 P.2d 827, 78 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969). For the same principle in the
private sector, see NLRB v. Armco Drainage & Metal Prods., Inc., 220 F.2d 573 (6th
Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 838 (1955).
83. See Friedman v. Union Free School Dist. No. 1, Town of Islip, 314 F. Supp. 223
(E.D.N.Y. 1970).
84. See Tinker v. Des Moines Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
85. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; for general discussion see Nowak, Realigning the
Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Guarantee-Prohibited, Neutral,
and Permissive Classifications, 62 GEo. L.J. 1071 (1974).
86. As discussed earlier, the use of institutional advantages, e.g., school mailboxes,
may be limited, but once they are made available to one union it will usually be
unconstitutional to deny use to another union, absent authorizing legislation. See, e.g.,
Local 1880, AFT v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 355 F. Supp. 594 (N.D. Fla. 1973); Dade
County Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. Ryan, 225 So.2d 903 (Fla. 1969).
87. See Tinker v. Des Moines Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Fried-
man v. Union Free School Dist. No. 1, Town of Islip, 314 F. Supp. 223 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
88. City of Madison Joint School Dist. No. 8 v. W.E.R.C., 69 Wis.2d 200, 231
N.W.2d 206 (1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3400 (U.S. Jan. 5, 1976) (No.
946). See Note, The Privilege of Exclusive Recognition and Minority Union Rights in
Public Employment, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 1004 (1970).
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consin Supreme Court found in this case that first amendment
rights were subordinate to the legislative interest in maintain-
ing a collective bargaining system.
The second case involves the power of a governmental em-
ployer to distinguish between union and non-union payroll
deductions and to permit the latter while denying the former."
The Fourth Circuit upheld the district court's injunction for-
bidding the city to refuse to withhold union dues under its
check-off procedures; that court also determined that under
the fourteenth amendment it would be difficult, albeit possi-
ble, for a public employer to discriminate in a constitutionally
permissible way between payroll deductions for union dues and
other payroll deductions. 0
An ever present issue in discussions of public sector unionism
is the right to strike. If the National Labor Relations Act were
amended so as to apply to public employees, such a right would
exist just as it does for private employees. However, the politi-
cal realities are such that although it is open to considerable
debate, it is extremely probable that a modification would re-
sult so as either to ban strikes or to provide a substitute mecha-
nism such as binding interest arbitration." Strike bans have
repeatedly been upheld as the courts find that a constitutional
right to strike does not exist.2 Likewise, courts have had little
difficulty in finding that interest arbitration, when limited by
appropriate standards, is constitutional and not an illegal dele-
gation of constitutional authority. These constitutional issues
89. City of Charlotte v. Firefighters Local 660, 381 F. Supp. 500 (4th Cir. 1975), cert.
granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3228 (U.S. Oct. 14, 1975) (No. 250).
90. Id. at 2609.
91. For example, see Postal Reorganization Act of 1970, where postal employees
were granted rights substantially the same as those guaranteed private sector employ-
ees under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), except for the right to strike. 39
U.S.C. §§ 1201-09 (1970).
92. The constitutionality of strike bans is illustrated in United Fed'n of Postal
Clerks v. Blount, 325F. Supp. 879 (D.D.C. 1971); aff'd mem., 404 U.S. 802 (1971); and
Anderson Fed'n of Teachers Local 519 v. School City of Anderson, 252 Ind. 558, 251
N.E.2d 15 (1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 928 (1970). For discussion of the prevalence
of interest arbitration, see Brown, supra note 8, at 703-05.
93. See McAvoy, Binding Arbitration of Contract Terms: A New Approach to the
Resolution of Disputes in the Public Sector, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 1192 (1972); Note,
Legality and Propriety of Agreements to Arbitrate Major and Minor Disputes in Public
Employment, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 129 (1968). However, a recent decision in New York
held unconstitutional as a violation of the one-vote principle a New York statute
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must be considered in formulating appropriate federal bargain-
ing legislation and, if possible, accommodated to the constitu-
tional requirements of governmental employers.
B. Possible Impact of Preemption on the States
In view of the expansive reach and supremacy of federal law
passed under the authority of the commerce clause as applied
to state laws, it is evident that there is a pressing need for
examining the possible impact of federal preemption on the
structures of state and local government. Commentators have
predicted that if the prevailing private sector law on preemp-
tion is followed in the public sector it "may create widespread
confusion and uncertainty; jeopardize important management
rights and employee benefits; threaten the stability and
viability of retirement funds; and lead to widespread and costly
litigation."94 Therefore, it is urged that a comprehensive sum-
mary analysis of all state and local laws should be a prerequis-
ite to passage of federal legislation. The fear of preemption
and the need for such "summary analysis" is vigorously decried
by other commentators who claim that the doctrine of preemp-
tion is manageable and that any such study would be useless
and of little assistance to Congress."
To understand the potential impact of preemption on the
states it is necessary to examine briefly the private sector pre-
cedents to establish a proper framework within which implica-
tions on the public sector can be discussed. The preemption
doctrine originates with the interplay between the authority of
Congress to legislate under its delegated powers and the tenth
amendment's reserving to the states powers not delegated to
the federal government. The question becomes, as between fed-
eral and state law on the same subject, which shall prevail. If
opposing arbitration in police and firefighters' disputes. City of Amsterdam v. Helsby,
79 Misc. 2d 677, 362 N.Y.S.2d 698 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
94. Statement by Dr. Myron Lieberman of Baruch College, City University of New
York. GERR No. 593, B-3 (1975).
95. Lieberman, Memorandum Analysis of Preemption Problems with Proposed Fed-
eral Bargaining Legislation for State/Local Employees, GERR No. 593, at E-2 (1975).
96. Chanin & Snyder, The Bugaboo of Federal Preemption: An Analysis of the
Relationship Between a Federal Collective Bargaining Statute for Employees of State
and Local Governments and State Statutes Affecting Such Employees, 3 FLA. ST. U.L.
REV. 236, 256 n.71 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Chanin & Snyder].
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there is a direct and irreconcilable conflict the federal law
clearly prevails under the supremacy clause of the Constitu-
tion. 7
The choice facing Congress as it seeks to legislate in an area
heretofore covered by state legislation is whether to respond to
the issue expressly or to leave it to a case-by-case determina-
tion.9" If the legislative intent is not clear then the judiciary will
have to determine whether Congress intended to displace coin-
cident state regulation in a given area.9" The leading private
sector case explaining the doctrine of preemption is San Diego
Building Trades Council v. Garmon,0 where the Court in in-
terpreting the NLRA held that Congress intended to assume
exclusive jurisdiction over activity "arguably protected or pro-
hibited" by the Act and that state regulation is permitted only
where the activity is of "peripheral concern" to the federal
policy or involves interests "deeply rooted in local feeling and
responsibility. "i°l
The effect of the application of that doctrine in the public
sector, in the context of a federal bargaining law, enjoys only
sparce public sector precedent. Authors Chanin and Snyder in
an article on the subject of preemption categorize the implica-
tions into three areas: 02 (1) state statutes in conflict with the
federal statutes; 0 3 (2) state collective bargaining statutes; and
97. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul,
holding that no judicial inquiry into congressional design is necessary "where compli-
ance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility .. "373 U.S.
132, 142-43 (1963). See also Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 548 (1975).
98. The Fair Labor Standards Act expressly provided that state and local govern-
ments must comply with the federal law, and any inconsistent laws would therefore
be invalid. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 218(a) (1970). The NLRA, on the
other hand, was silent on preemptive effect and left to the courts the arduous task of
case-by-case analysis. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
99. See, e.g., Beasley v. Food Fair, 416 U.S. 653 (1974).
100. 359 U.S. 236 (1959). See also Note, Federal Preemption: Government Interests
and the Role of the Supreme Court, 1966 DUKE L.J. 484.
101. 359 U.S. at 243-44. A broader rationale for preemption rooted in a conflict of
state law with a uniform national labor policy intended by Congress, permits a court
to find preemption more easily than in Garmon. See Teamsters Local 20 v. Morton,
377 U.S. 252, 260 (1964); Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 345 U.S. 485 (1953). For a
thorough discussion of the area, see generally Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited,
85 HARv. L. REv. 1337 (1972).
102. Chanin & Snyder, supra note 96, at 236.
103. As was discussed under the supremacy clause and cases like Fry v. United
States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975), there is no doubt that direct conflicts will be resolved by
upholding the federal statute.
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(3) state statutes' establishing terms and conditions of public
employment.
The implication of preemption on existing state bargaining
legislation, absent express congressional intent, is that state
legislation would be displaced inasmuch as it would fall within
the private sector Garmon rule, i.e., the rights affected would
arguably be protected or prohibited by the federal law. 04
The most difficult area in which to assess implications of
preemption deals with the effect a federal bargaining law might
have on state statutes which establish terms and conditions of
employment. In 1957 the Supreme Court, in California v.
Taylor, "1'5 held that a state-operated railroad was subject to the
Federal Railway Labor Act, which permitted employee bar-
gaining notwithstanding a state statute prohibiting it.106 The
Court added that the negotiated collective bargaining agree-
ment "would take precedence over conflicting provisions of the
state civil service laws."' 17 A later case amplified the import of
that statement when the Court held that a state law cannot be
applied to prevent "the contracting parties from carrying out
their agreement upon a subject matter as to which federal law
directs them to bargain."'' "8 Thus, it appears clear that preced-
ent exists for the displacement of many state statutes by the
preemptive effects of the federal bargaining law.10° On the
highly provocative question of whether all state statutes estab-
lishing terms and conditions would be invalidated by the mere
passage of a federal bargaining law, i.e., even before execution
of an inconsistent agreement, an argument exists that to hold
104. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
105. 353 U.S. 553 (1957).
106. Id. at 559-67. This conclusion would likewise follow under the Garner rationale
discussed supra note 101.
107. California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553, 561 (1957).
108. Teamsters Local 24 v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 295 (1959); the Court added that
to hold otherwise "would defeat the full realization of the congressional purpose . . .
[and] frustrate the parties' solution of a problem which Congress has required them
to negotiate in good faith toward solving, and has imposed no limitations relevant
here." Id. at 295-96. The Court provided that exceptions to this preemption could exist,
as for example, "local health or safety regulations" might prevail. For discussion of
this issue as it could relate to public employees, see Chanin & Snyder, supra note 96,
at 247.
109. For an analogous case see Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Commonwealth Dep't of
Labor and Indus., 12 Pa. 292, 314 A.2d 862 (1974).
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otherwise would improperly fetter what is statutorily required
to be free and open bargaining. There is a paucity of case law
on this issue and any tentative conclusions would be only spec-
ulative and premature."10
In summary the constitutional implications of constitution-
ally authorized federal bargaining legislation are of sufficient
magnitude to warrant heightened concern and precise legisla-
tive drafting so as to minimize potential adverse or undesired
effects.
IV. FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE OPPORTUNITIES
In allocating power between the national and state govern-
ments the Supreme Court has made clear that national power
predominates in the field of regulating commerce. The consti-
tutional basis for regulating the labor relations of the states is
likewise clear. Arguments that such legislation will cut too
deeply into state sovereignty and policy decision-making lose
much of their force when consideration is given to the sub-
stance of proposed federal legislation which would require the
parties to engage in employment contract negotiations within
and under the guidance of a statutory scheme, just as is pres-
ently done in nearly forty states, and that neither party must
agree to terms or capitulate to unreasonable terms any more
than is done absent federal legislation."'
Should Congress deem federal bargaining legislation desira-
ble, specific legislative opportunities now exist to shape it in
such a way as to accommodate the competing tenets of federal-
ism and to minimize the anticipated constitutional difficulties.
First of all, the constitutional difficulties created by the fact
that governmental employers, as government, must observe
first and fourteenth amendment requirements are of no greater
complexity than those which presently occur under state bar-
110. For speculation on this issue, see Chanin & Snyder, supra note 96, at 248-54.
111. For example, the NLRA imposes an obligation to bargain but specifically states
that "such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require
the making of a concession. ... 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1970). Indeed some public employ-
ers have opted for federal coverage under the NLRA so as to gain access to procedures
and remedies against union unfair labor practices not available under state statutes.
See Ferguson, Collective Bargaining in Universities and Colleges, 19 LAB. L.J. 778, 784
(1968). See generally D. STANLEY, MANAGING LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNDER UNION
PRESSURE (1972); H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, JR., THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES (1971).
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gaining statutory schemes. Interestingly, the results of much of
the pre-election constitutional litigation parallel the NLRB
precedents governing unfair labor practices, e.g., employers are
limited to nondiscriminatory treatment of competing unions in
granting advantages. Additional case law regulating no-
solicitation rules also shows that a balancing of first amend-
ment rights in effect provides much the same type of regulation
permitted under the NLRA. The appropriate relationship be-
tween exclusive recognition and the rights of employee-citizens
to petition their government will undergo Supreme Court re-
view this session; and it is likely that a result similar to the
NLRA proscription guaranteeing employee access to the em-
ployer will be approved although the public employee's rights
may well need to be held more absolute." 2 These difficulties
can best be minimized through federal legislation, which could
take cognizance of the constitutional obligations of public em-
ployers and direct administrative interpretations to comport
with them.
On the issue of preemption and the best method by which
to achieve an appropriate balance between federal and state
policy, it is clearly preferable for Congress to state its intention
expressly. This would preclude considerable litigation and per-
mit bargaining to commence within clear guidelines, prevent-
ing the private sector preemption analogies from clouding is-
sues of bargainable subjects such as terms and conditions of
employment. Many options are available to Congress in adopt-
ing an express policy concerning the preemptive effect of a
collective bargaining statute for public employees. The possi-
bilities range from total invalidation of state laws establishing
terms and conditions of public employment to a policy which
would not invalidate any such provisions."3 Other options in-
clude permitting statutes to remain unaffected unless su-
perseded by collective bargaining agreements,"' permitting
112. While this would not be applicable to access for "statutory bargaining" pur-
poses, it would apply to access for individual grievances. The NLRA typifies state
statutory provisions which preserve the rights of individuals to present grievances to
their employers. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
113. See Chanin & Snyder, supra note 96, at 256.
114. Most statutes which have considered the problem of potentially conflicting
statutory provisions such as civil service laws as a limitation on the scope of bargaining
have provided that civil service legislation takes precedence. See Brown, supra note 8,
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statutes to remain valid but susceptible to being supplemented
by agreement, or to undertake specifically by legislation (or to
authorize by administrative interpretation) the selection of
those types of statutes which would be valid or invalid (i.e.,
defining the scope of bargaining to permit or deny negotiation
on such subjects as personal leave or retirement)." The ulti-
mate decision necessarily requires legislative judgment; how-
ever, in considering the options this author would submit that
there are clearly preferable courses to follow which would mini-
mize potential litigation and better accommodate the needs of
federalism.
That Congress has the constitutional authority to create fed-
eral bargaining legislation does not mean that it should exer-
cise it to the fullest extent possible. The values of federalism
remain viable and while a uniform approach and legislative
structure appear desirable, the appeal of diversity and permit-
ting the state and local governments to develop and maintain
their own labor relations schemes, so as to minimize the impact
on their legislative and constitutional .structures, also remains
highly desirable. The objective of any federal bargaining legis-
lation is to provide certain minimum standards which guide
and govern the parties in their negotiations. Therefore, it ap-
pears that it is possible to accommodate some of the legitimate
state interests (sovereignty) in retained control of labor rela-
tions, while simultaneously protecting certain minimum bar-
gaining rights on a uniform basis. This can be accomplished by
establishing a system of federal-state regulation under a
minimum standards collective bargaining statute."'
This system would delineate basic guidelines for public sec-
tor labor relations, reserving ultimate administrative authority
at 702 n.82. See also Comment, The Civil Service- Collective Bargaining Conflict in
the Public Sector: Attempts at Reconciliation, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 826 (1971). Michigan,
on the other hand, took a different course when the Michigan Supreme Court held that
those sections of the civil service laws dealing with mandatory subjects of bargaining
under the collective bargaining laws were superseded pro tanto by the latter legislation.
Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Wayne County Bd. of Supervisors, 348 Mich. 363, 184 N.W.2d
201 (1971).
115. Of course, the NLRB is not beyond performing such a task and has been
defining mandatory and non-mandatory bargaining subjects for many years. See, e.g.,
NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958); Note, The Scope of Collective
Bargaining, 74 YALE L.J. 1472 (1965).
116. See Brown, supra note 8, at 716-20.
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to the federal government but allowing the states broad discre-
tion to fashion rules of implementation and to experiment with
innovative provisions in substantive areas such as scope of bar-
gaining"7 and impasse resolution. This act would provide all
state and local employees with certain "minimum standards"
of essential bargaining rights,"' and would provide that any
state or local governmental unit with a law in "substantial
conformity" or the "substantial equivalent" would be given the
authority to administer its own law, subject only to federal
administrative review."9 Noncomplying states would be sub-
ject to a comprehensive federal statute administered by a fed-
eral agency.
The advantages of this system are obvious. It minimizes the
basic antagonism of those who resist federal encroachment
upon state labor relations; it reduces the potential burden of
federal administrative machinery; and it promotes diversity in
reaching solutions to the complex problems facing state and
local governments in their labor relations. Additionally, the
constitutional implications of preemption would be minimized
(assuming compliance by the states) and in situations necessi-
tating an examination of the preemptive effects of federal legis-
lation, clearly expressed congressional intent with respect to
the reach by the federal government into matters such as bar-
gainable subjects would provide clear guidance and stability to
public sector bargaining relationships. To lessen the disruptive
effects of a new federal bargaining law, it would seem prefera-
ble that Congress consider, as the proper stance on the preemp-
tion issue, permitting present statutes concerning terms and
117. As discussed, some legislative guidance as to the preemptive effects, if any, on
the mandatory subjects of bargaining would be needed.
118. The essential minimum standards should include at least the recognition of the
right to organize and bargain; creation of an administrative agency to make determina-
tions on appropriate bargaining units, representation questions, unfair labor practices,
and impasse resolution; guidelines providing for secret ballot elections and exclusive
recognition; mandatory bargaining in good faith obligations; and binding grievance
arbitration. For more complete treatment see Brown, supra note 8, at 718. For support
of this approach see Chanin & Snyder, supra note 96, at 262.
119. A variation of this approach could be used as is done by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission to permit deferral by the federal agency to the state agency.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1970),.as amended, (Supp. II, 1972); and implementing
regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12 (1975). This deferral arrangement was upheld by the
Supreme Court in Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522 (1972).
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conditions to remain valid though subject to supplementation
by a negotiated agreement. Admittedly, this places a burden
on the public employer, who must begin bargaining with a
statutorily-created minimum benefit package which would
permit public employees additionally to attempt to gain bene-
fits through both political action or the collective bargaining
process. An alternative is to invalidate state employee benefit
statutes, if that is legally and politically possible. These are
difficult decisions and one can be assured that any new federal
collective bargaining law will be the result of legislative com-
promise. The result of that compromise will be benefited by a
full understanding of the constitutional implications of
preemption and the available legislative options for creative
legislation on the subject. 20
120. Essential to making certain the statutory scheme works is the assurance that
it will be adequately funded. This could be accomplished by legislative direction, e~g.,
making it a criterion of "substantial equivalency," or by tying such a condition to the
grant of federal funds. Presently under the Urban Mass Transit Act, 49 U.S.C. §
1609(3)(c) (1970) federal money is made available to public transit agencies which were
formerly privately owned with the condition that the employees, now public, be per-
mitted to bargain like their private sector counterparts with the exception that strikes
are banned and binding interest arbitration is substituted therefor. In a state which
did not otherwise authorize public sector bargaining, authorizing legislation was
needed to qualify for the funds, and is usually passed. See, e.g., VA. CODE § 15.1-1357.2
(1974). Of course, more sophisticated grant inducements can be designed to meet the
special needs of a federal collective bargaining statute.
121. On June 24, 1976, the Supreme Court decided the National League of Cities v.
Dunlop case on a date too late to permit integration into this publication. The ruling
is significant in that it appears to have halted the easy and automatic expansion of
federal powers over commerce where it interferes with state sovereignty. In a 5-4
decision, the majority said it did not believe the reasoning of Maryland v. Wirtz "may
any longer be regarded as authoritative." It was held that Congress may not exercise
its power under the commerce clause "so as to force directly upon the states its choices
as to how essential decisions regarding the conduct of integral government functions
are to be made" because to do so would "allow the national government to devour the
essentials of state sovereignty." The Court did not accept the tenth amendment argu-
ment. The dissent questioned the majority's legal basis and said it appeared in "dero-
gation of the sovereign power of the nation to regulate commerce."
Whether this holding is distinguishable from federal legislation regulating state and
local collective bargaining remains to be seen, but it can be observed that the FLSA
imposed wage-and-hour requirements on governmental employers whereas the bar-
gaining legislation would require only that certain procedures be followed and nothing
specifically must be agreed to. Additionally, a minimum-standards-legislation ap-
proach as suggested in this article would minimize the unconstitutional aspects. N. Y.
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